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Do countries fail to raise environmental standards? 
An evaluation of policy options addressing ‘regulatory chill’ 
 
Abstract: It is an important prerequisite of sustainable development that countries are 
able to raise their environmental standards. Environmentalists are concerned, however, 
that with enhanced international capital mobility the fear of capital loss might induce 
countries not to raise standards – a phenomenon commonly described as ‘regulatory 
chill’. This article argues that while it is difficult to prove the validity of this claim, there 
exists substantial anecdotal evidence that ‘regulatory chill’ is relevant with respect to 
one issue at least: global warming. Several policy options are evaluated to deal with this 
problem according to a specified set of criteria. It is found that upward harmonisation of 
environmental standards and multilateral trade restrictions as part of multilateral envi-
ronmental agreement are the preferred policy options. 
 
Keywords: regulatory chill, capital flight, global warming, energy tax, harmonisation, 
multilateral trade restrictions 
 
1 Introduction 
This article addresses a concern by environmentalists with respect to international mo-
bility of capital. The concern is that countries might fail to raise environmental stan-
dards for fear of capital flight - a phenomenon that is commonly described as ‘regulatory 
chill’ or, less commonly, as ‘stuck in the mud’ (Zarsky 1997; Greenpeace 1999; Maybey 
and McGilvray 1999; Porter 1999). This article will examine what evidence is there in 
favour of this claim and evaluate policy options to deal with the problem. 
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Sustainable development is an intensively contested concept (Neumayer 1999). 
However, no matter what the concrete definition is one wants to apply, a necessary con-
dition for its achievement is that countries are able to raise environmental standards. In 
other words, ‘regulatory chill’, if existent, is inimical to sustainable development. It is 
therefore important to assess the evidence with respect to this phenomenon and evaluate 
policy options to deal with it. 
A priori, we would expect ‘regulatory chill’ to be more prevalent with respect to en-
vironmental standards concerning pollutants affecting the so-called global commons, 
such as the global climate, the ozone layer, and biodiversity. We would expect it to be 
less significant for environmental standards concerning pollutants affecting the national 
environment only. This is because in the case of the global commons, the benefits of 
raising environmental standards have to be shared with all or at least many other coun-
tries as well. In as far as capital flight is perceived to be one of the costs of raising envi-
ronmental standards, it will become relatively more important in this case then, as the 
costs are balanced against dispersed benefits. 
What aggravates an examination of the evidence with respect to ‘regulatory chill’ is 
that the claim refers to the absence of something that would otherwise have happened 
(namely, the raising of environmental standards). Thus it makes in effect a counter-
factual claim for which systematic statistical evidence is, almost by definition, difficult, 
if not impossible, to gather. In the words of Mabey and McNally (1999, p. 38): ‘That 
there is little statistical evidence of this ‘chilling effect’ is unsurprising, because evi-
dence is needed of what has not happened. This issue must be investigated by historians 
and political scientists, not econometricians.’ It follows that one needs to look at anec-
dotal evidence to gauge the validity of the hypothesis. 
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The next section presents some of this evidence with respect to one environmental 
issue for which the existence of regulatory chill can be demonstrated quite well and 
which is caused by emissions that are clearly unsustainable: global warming. The main 
part of this article is contained in section 3, however, which evaluates various policy 
options to deal with ‘regulatory chill’ according to a specified set of criteria. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2 Some anecdotal evidence with respect to global warming 
Esty and Geradin (1998, p. 19) believe that the fear of capital loss has a ‘most signifi-
cant impact (...) on the environmental policy-making process’. They suggest that ‘in 
almost every political debate over environmental policy in the United States, competi-
tiveness concerns are cited as a reason not to move toward tougher standards’ (ibid., p. 
20). While this quote refers to ‘competitiveness concerns’ more generally, it is relevant 
for investment issues as well, as exit of its capital would be the ultimate effect of a ju-
risdiction’s ‘loss of competitiveness’.  
What Esty and Geradin suggest for the eminent importance of ‘competitiveness’ is-
sues for environmental policy making in the United States holds true for Germany as 
well. The Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) and other industrial associa-
tions have continuously warned policy makers that further raising environmental stan-
dards, especially with respect to a so-called ecological tax reform, would damage the 
competitiveness of German industry and would lead to capital flight out of Germany 
(BDI 1998, 1999). But do these concerns and threats really translate into ‘regulatory 
chill’? Are policy makers scared away from raising standards or do they regard these 
threats by industry groups as cheap talk whose only function is to prevent policies that 
would raise costs to the industry and (potentially) lower its profits? 
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In the following I will concentrate on one issue for which I believe that we have suf-
ficient evidence to show that the fear of capital loss has actually led to a ‘regulatory 
chill’. The issue is how much developed countries should reduce air emissions, particu-
larly greenhouse gas emissions, and, specifically, whether they should introduce a tax on 
fossil fuels to achieve reductions in these emissions. As concerns the United States, 
President Clinton’s initial plan to introduce a 25.5 cents per million of British Thermal 
Units (BTUs) energy tax over a period of three years was defeated not least by the mas-
sive resistance by the ‘American Energy Alliance’, behind which stood the National 
Association of Manufacturers, and the Affordable Energy Alliance as well as the 
American Petroleum Institute, behind which in turn stands the US oil industry (Erlands-
son 1994). These lobby groups claimed that such a tax would reduce their ‘competitive-
ness’ with a consequent loss of jobs and might ultimately lead to a flight of capital out 
of the U.S. 
Similarly, the United States’ position in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations was signifi-
cantly influenced by the opposition of some of its industries, which gathered in the so-
called Global Climate Change Coalition (GCC), as well as the AFL-CIO, the major US 
trade union, which again warned that millions of jobs would be lost due to decreased 
competitiveness and capital flight if a climate change protocol did not encompass the 
major developing countries (BNA 1997; API 2000; Zarsky 1997, p. 36f.).1 As a result, 
the U.S. Senate voted 95-0, with five senators not voting, in favour of a motion that the 
U.S. must not sign a treaty which does not mandate ‘new specific scheduled commit-
ments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for developing country parties within 
the same compliance period’ or would result in ‘serious harm to the economy of the 
United States’ (BNA 1997) - ‘where by “serious harm“ the Senate meant, in the words 
of Senator Robert Byrd, a co-author of the resolution, “capital flight and a loss of jobs in 
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the United States“’ (Barrett 1998, p. 21). In the end, the U.S. government signed the 
Kyoto Protocol, which does not include any emissions reduction obligations for devel-
oping countries. But whether this signature will be followed by the necessary ratification 
through the U.S. Senate is far from clear. Immediately after the U.S. government’s sig-
nature under the Kyoto Protocol, the GCC, the Competitive Enterprise Institute as well 
as Republican Senator Chuck Nagel, co-sponsor of the above mentioned motion, called 
for President Clinton to bring the Protocol to the Senate floor so that it could be rejected 
(BNA 1998). The Clinton administration wisely refused, saying it will not submit the 
treaty until more developing countries agreed to limit their emissions of greenhouse 
gases (ibid.). 
As concerns the European Union (EU), its Commission had originally proposed a 
community-wide introduction of a tax on carbon dioxide emissions and energy in 1992 
(European Commission 1992), which, among other things, would have raised the price 
of petrol by about $10 per barrel in 2000. Eight years later, at the time of writing this 
article, this tax has still not materialised and it is highly unlikely that it ever will.2 At 
least partly this failure is to be explained by opposition from business groups, which did 
not leave policy makers, even those from environmental ‘leaders’ such as the Scandina-
vian countries and Germany, unimpressed. Maybe more importantly, however, the 
Commission’s original proposal had the possibility for ‘regulatory chill’ already in-
cluded. This is because in its Art. 1 it conditioned the realisation of the tax within the 
EU on the introduction ‘by other member countries of the OECD of a similar tax or of 
measures having a financial impact equivalent to those provided for in this Directive’. In 
other words, the Commission was so much impressed by the threat of ‘loss of competi-
tiveness’ and, ultimately, loss of capital, that it accepted not raising environmental stan-
dards if other OECD countries did not follow suit. As the likelihood of this to happen, 
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especially with respect to the US, was very small indeed, the EU’s regulatory efforts 
were effectively chilled. 
As concerns Germany, the ecological tax reform became realised after a Social De-
mocrat-Green coalition took over power at the federal level in October 1998. However, 
the tax reform had to be downsized and had to include a number of exceptions for en-
ergy-intensive industries due to immense pressure from industrial lobby groups. Ironi-
cally, the Federal Environment Minister himself rushed to persuade industries and the 
public alike that with so many exceptions and rather low tax rates capital flight out of 
Germany has been effectively prevented (BMU 2000). Quite similarly, in the case of 
Sweden the manufacturing industry is exempted from half of the energy and carbon di-
oxide tax and the electricity production for the manufacturing industry is not taxed at all 
(OECD 1999, p. 67). 
Are policies trying to overcome ‘regulatory chill’ necessary? The conclusion from the 
anecdotal evidence is that the fear of ‘loss of competitiveness’ in general and loss of 
capital in particular, seems to have exerted some regulatory chilling effect on developed 
countries with respect to reducing greenhouse and other air emissions and, in particular, 
with respect to introducing taxes on fossil fuels. This chilling effect did not completely 
prevent the introduction of carbon abatement policies. After all, the United States and 
other developed countries did sign the Kyoto Protocol (but have not ratified it yet), 
Germany has entered into an ecological tax reform, the Scandinavian countries had ear-
lier already introduced carbon/energy taxes (Brack, Grubb and Windram 2000, pp. 59-
70) and a European Union wide carbon tax might still materialise. But it is also true that 
policy makers in developed countries did not introduce abatement policies as stringent 
as they would have otherwise done had they not been concerned about ‘loss of competi-
tiveness’ and loss of capital. 
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Whether this evidence in favour of the ‘regulatory chill’-hypothesis holds true for 
other environmental issues as well is not fully clear. Not many case studies have been 
undertaken on this matter and there is a clear need for future research. But greenhouse 
gas and other air emissions cause major environmental problems, so that it is appropri-
ate to move one step further and evaluate policy options to deal with ‘regulatory chill’. 
 
 
3 An evaluation of policy options to deal with ‘regulatory chill’ 
3.1 Policy options and criteria of evaluation 
In this section, I will examine a number of policy options to deal with the problem of 
‘regulatory chill’: 
 
Harmonisation of environmental standards and minimum standards. This can ei-
ther refer to the harmonisation of environmental laws and regulations or to the harmoni-
sation of environment-related taxes. An existing example for this on a regional level are 
Art. 93, 95 and 175 of the Treaty establishing the EU. Art. 93 provides for the harmoni-
sation of indirect taxes. Art. 95 has as its objective the adoption of ‘measures for the 
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the in-
ternal market’ (Art. 95:1). Art. 175 has as its objective the harmonisation of ‘measures 
answering environmental protection requirements’ (Art. 174:2). EU harmonised stan-
dards are in principle to be interpreted as setting minimum standards that can be ex-
ceeded by member states under certain conditions. Art. 95:10 allows for harmonisation 
measures to include, in appropriate cases, ‘a safeguard clause authorising the Member 
State to take, for one or more of the non-economic reasons referred to in Article 30, 
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provisional measures subject to a Community control procedure’. Art. 95:4 allows EU 
member states, more generally, to maintain national provisions if it deems them neces-
sary for the protection of the environment. Similarly, Art. 176 proclaims that harmonisa-
tion based on Art. 175 ‘shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or intro-
ducing more stringent protective measures’. 
Enforcement agreements. An existing example are Art. 3 and 5 of the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, the environmental side agreement to 
NAFTA, which reads as follows: 
 
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and 
environmental development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental 
laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of envi-
ronmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations. (Art. 3). 
With the aim of achieving high levels of environmental protection and compliance with its environmental 
laws and regulations, each Party shall effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations through 
appropriate governmental action... (Art. 5:1). 
Each party shall ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings are avail-
able under its law to sanction or remedy violations of its environmental laws and regulations. (Art. 5:2). 
 
Multilateral trade restrictions. These play an important role in multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements (MEAs). Their purpose is to deter non-compliance by parties to 
the agreement (internal free-riding) and to encourage participation (deter external free-
riding) (Neumayer 2001a). Many of the most important MEAs - the Montreal Protocol, 
the Basel and Rotterdam Convention, the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species - contain substantial trade restrictions (Neumayer 2000). Another prob-
lem, which can be addressed by restrictive multilateral trade measures is so-called leak-
age. Leakage describes the phenomenon that a decrease in emissions by the participants 
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to an agreement is counter-acted by an increase of emissions by non-members. Such an 
increase can be a deliberate decision by the free-riding countries or can be unintended. 
To understand this point, take the example of carbon dioxide emissions. If a sub-set of 
all countries agrees on limiting their carbon dioxide emissions, then production of car-
bon-intensive goods and services becomes relatively more expensive in these countries. 
Comparative advantage in these goods and services shifts to the non-participating coun-
tries who increase their production of carbon-intensive goods and services. Similarly, 
some especially carbon-intensive industries might migrate from signatory to non-
signatory countries. Also, the reduction in demand for fossil fuels due to the limitation 
of carbon dioxide emissions by the participants to the agreement will lower world fossil 
fuel prices which increases demand for fossil fuels in non-member countries. 
Border tax adjustments (BTAs). These are defined as the imposition of a domestic tax 
on an imported good, which has been taxed either not at all or at a level less than the 
domestic tax, and the remission of a domestic tax on products to be exported.3 
Subsidies. These could be granted in the form of per unit of production or lump-sump 
payments to ‘footloose’, pollution-intensive or energy-intensive industries. 
 
I will apply the following set of criteria in assessing these options: 
 
• Effective: A policy option should achieve its objective of combating ‘regulatory 
chill’. 
• Politically realistic: A policy option should be politically realistic. Otherwise it has 
no chance of being realised. 
• Closed to abuse: A policy option should not be open to abuse by protectionist fac-
tions in high standard countries under flimsy environmental pretexts. 
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• Not unnecessarily restrictive: A policy option should not restrict international flows 
of capital and trade beyond the necessary extent. It is this author’s conviction that a 
liberal capital and trade regime is desirable, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.2 Effective 
The introduction of minimum standards in itself is likely to be ineffective. The essential 
problem of ‘environmental chill’ is that countries fail to raise standards above other 
countries’ standards for fear of capital flight. This fear might be alleviated, but will not 
be overcome by setting a minimum standard, which will merely mean that those coun-
tries with the lowest standards have to raise their standards to the minimum. A ‘com-
petitive disadvantage’ can still be perceived relative to countries at the minimum stan-
dard. The same applies to countries above the minimum standard, but below the current 
or future raised standard of the country considering raising its standards. Minimum 
standards can be more effective if they themselves are raised continuously, because then 
the environmental frontrunners can trust that their advance will sooner or later be 
matched by proportional increases in the minimum standards faced by other countries. 
Whether harmonisation of standards is an effective policy option depends on what 
kind of harmonisation occurs. If harmonisation is downward, that is if high standards 
countries lower their standards considerably more than low standards countries raise 
theirs in order to agree on a common, but relatively low, standard, then this option will 
be completely ineffective. Instead of overcoming the obstacles to raising environmental 
standards, these same standards are lowered. Things can be different if harmonisation is 
upward, however. In this case, high standards countries will lower their standards con-
siderably less than low standards countries raise theirs. In the extreme case, they might 
not lower their standards at all. Because countries now agree on a common, but rela-
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tively high, standard, advanced countries have then less reason to fear that further rais-
ing their standards will lead to considerable loss of capital. However, high standards 
countries might only induce low standards countries to agree on upward harmonisation 
if they commit to not further raising their standards or, more realistically, if they commit 
to not insisting on further rounds of upward harmonisation in case they raised their stan-
dards after the initial upward harmonisation. In other words, upward harmonisation of 
standards might only be achievable at the expense of excluding or at least making more 
difficult further upward harmonisations. In this case, ‘regulatory chill’ would only be 
alleviated once, but not permanently. 
Enforcement agreements are likely to be ineffective in overcoming regulatory chill 
as they do nothing to raise standards, but merely attempt to enforce existing standards. 
They might even lead to the perverse effect of exacerbating the problem. This is because 
it might impose a further fear on a country contemplating a rise in environmental stan-
dards: that it would be obliged via international agreement to enforce these higher stan-
dards. 
Multilateral trade restrictions can be effective if they are part of the instruments of a 
multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) to ensure compliance with the treaty and 
deter free-riding. The idea is that instead of unilateral action a multitude of countries 
agree on raising their respective environmental standards. This collective action over-
comes the prisoner’s dilemma in which countries facing ‘regulatory chill’ are caught: 
countries would like to raise their environmental standards, but only if all other coun-
tries raise their respective standards as well since otherwise the costs of loss of capital 
are feared to outweigh the benefits from unilateral standard raising. But, in order to be 
successful, this kind of collective action needs to ensure compliance of the participating 
countries (deter internal free-riding). Also, it needs to ensure that as many countries as 
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possible participate in the multilateral agreement. That is, external free-riding needs to 
be deterred. Trade restrictions can be an effective instrument to deter both internal as 
well as external free-riding (Barrett 1997). If they are effective, then they can overcome 
‘regulatory chill’. 
Subsidies to ‘footloose’ or pollution-intensive or energy-intensive industries can in 
principle be an effective policy option. If they fully compensate the industries for any 
cost increases due to higher environmental standards then there is no incentive for these 
industries to flee the country. However, depending on the way in which subsidies take 
place the initial environmental objective can become partly defeated. If some industrial 
sectors receive an implicit subsidy in simply exempting them from the taxes or offering 
them a lower tax rate, then the environmental benefits will be lower than they would 
otherwise be.4 Alternatively, the tax rates facing all non-exempted agents have to be 
raised to secure achieving the same level of environmental benefits. Also, exemption of 
certain industries from taxation leads to all sorts of inter-sectoral allocative inefficien-
cies. Furthermore, it will attract firms into the subsidised industries as it raises their rela-
tive profitability. If the ‘footloose’ industries are also pollution-intensive industries, this 
re-allocation of capital will again partly defeat the environmental objective. To avoid the 
negative effects of subsidisation on the environmental benefits achieved, the full tax rate 
should equally apply to all industries and the ‘footloose’ industries should receive a 
lump-sum subsidy to compensate them for their total cost increases. It should be noted, 
however, that this option will still lead to allocative inefficiencies as subsidised indus-
tries become more profitable relative to non-subsidised industries. 
BTAs can in principle be an effective policy option. If foreign competitors have to 
pay the differential in environmental compliance cost at the border and if domestic ex-
porters are fully compensated for complying with higher environmental standards, then 
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there is no incentive for capital to flee the country. However, because compensating 
domestic exporters for cost differentials is equivalent to providing them with a subsidy, 
BTAs can face the same kind of problems with allocative inefficiencies and defeat of 
the environmental objectives as discussed with respect to subsidies above. The higher is 
the share of domestic production that becomes exported, the more prevalent will these 
problems become. 
 
3.3 Politically realistic 
The introduction of minimum standards as well as the harmonisation of international 
standards or an enforcement agreement does not currently seem to be pursued with any 
great vigour by developed countries, at least outside the EU. Even within the EU there is 
no great momentum apparent towards the harmonisation of environment-related taxes. 
However, should developed countries decide to pursue harmonisation there would be no 
hindrances by international trade rules as the WTO does not prohibit consensually 
agreed upon minimum or harmonised standards. The same is true with respect to an 
enforcement agreement. 
Trade restrictions have become a common instrument in MEAs. Their consistency 
with WTO rules is not entirely clear, but no MEA related trade restriction has ever been 
challenged before the WTO (for more information, see Neumayer 2001b, chapter 9). 
What is of interest here is whether the MEAs themselves are politically realistic. Multi-
lateral action with respect to the environment is often difficult to bring about, takes a 
long time and is regarded by many environmentalists as insufficient since countries tend 
to agree on the lowest common denominator. The Kyoto Protocol represents a case in 
point: It took nearly six years after the Rio Summit to conclude a binding agreement. 
The past difficulties in bringing about this agreement are legendary as are, and even 
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more so, the future difficulties of bringing the Protocol into force and of deciding on the 
many particularities left unaddressed. Indeed, one of the issues still to be addressed is 
whether and how trade restrictions should play a role in ensuring compliance and deter-
ring free-riding. Finally, many environmentalists consider the Protocol as falling so 
much short of what they regard as necessary action that presumably they would regard 
the Protocol as further proof for ‘regulatory chill’ rather than as a significant step to-
wards its overcoming. 
BTAs are usually liked by domestic policy makers who find the notion that foreign 
competitors must face the same environmental compliance costs as domestic producers 
appealing. However, BTAs can clash with international trade rules. WTO rules allow 
BTAs for taxes on environmentally-damaging products, which are quite common. They 
also allow for BTAs for product-related environmental taxes, as can be seen by a WTO 
panel decision upholding a US tax on luxury cars and a gas guzzler tax (WTO 1994). 
BTAs for non-product related taxes, usually known as taxes on process and production 
methods (PPM), are much less common, but there are two prominent examples. One is 
BTA for chemicals manufactured using base chemicals as feedstock, which were subject 
to product taxation in the US. As this tax was part of the US Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 it is commonly referred to in the literature as the super-
fund tax. The other example is BTA for ozone-depleting chemicals, which were subject 
to product taxation in the US as part of its effort to phase out the production and use of 
these substances. Whereas the BTA for the ozone-tax was never challenged under the 
rules of the international trade regime, the BTA for the superfund tax was. In 1987 a 
GATT panel basically upheld the BTA for the superfund tax because the taxed input 
was to some extent physically incorporated in the final product (GATT 1987). If, on the 
other hand, the taxed input is not physically incorporated in the final product, then the 
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relevant WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures does not seem to 
allow for BTA.5 As most environmentally relevant inputs into the production process do 
not become physically incorporated in the final product, WTO rules would forbid the 
use of BTA for most cases in which countries would want to apply them. Furthermore, 
WTO rules do not allow for BTAs for cost differences that follow implicitly from higher 
environmental standards if these higher standards are not realised via higher taxes or 
charges, but via command-and-control or other forms of regulation instead. That the 
relevant WTO rules could be reformed to allow for general PPM related BTAs is highly 
unlikely. First, there does not seem to be strong support for such a reform even among 
the developed countries. Brack, Grubb and Windram (2000, p. 86f.) cite a letter from a 
US Trade Representative official referring to an informal (‘Gentlemen’) agreement 
among developed countries to the effect that the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures 
 
was never intended to fundamentally expand the right of countries to apply border adjustment for a 
broad range of taxes on energy, especially in the developed world (...). We discussed the matter with other 
developed countries involved in the Subsidies Code negotiations. We are satisfied that they share our 
views on the purpose of the text as drafted and the importance of careful international examination before 
any broader policy conclusions should be drawn regarding border adjustment and energy taxes. 
 
Second, because a reform of WTO rules would need a two third majority according 
to Art. X:3 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, developing countries would need 
to consent as well. However, they are completely against such a reform as they rightly 
fear that they would be affected by BTAs as well (or even predominantly so) and not 
just developed countries themselves (ICTSD 1999). 
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Subsidies seem to be politically realistic as they might be considered an easy option 
less overtly intrusive into foreign countries’ rights. However, as they might be regarded 
as giving domestic industries an unfair advantage they might still be regarded as harmful 
to foreign countries and might therefore clash with international trade rules. The WTO’s 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measured distinguishes between subsidies 
that are widely available within the economy and subsidies that are specific to certain 
enterprises, industries or regions (Art. 2). It imposes rules only on the latter category. 
Specific subsidies are prohibited if they are contingent on export performance or local 
content (Art. 3). Otherwise, with few exceptions, they are actionable, that is subject to 
challenge if they cause adverse effects to the interests of another WTO member country. 
To cause adverse effects, a subsidy must cause injury and serious prejudice to the indus-
try of another country which would nullify or impair its benefits under the GATT treaty 
(Art. 5). As serious prejudice is difficult to prove, there exists a presumption of serious 
prejudice if subsidies are greater than 5 per cent ad valorem, cover operating losses or 
accrue in the form of direct forgiveness of debt (Art. 6). One of the types of subsidies 
excepted from the rules laid down in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures and therefore non-actionable is assistance to adapt existing industries 
to new environmental requirements (Art. 8.2 (c)). However, to qualify such assistance 
must occur only once, not cover more than 20 per cent of the adaptation costs and has to 
be made available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and processes. As 
most subsidies would not fall in this category and could well exceed 5 per cent ad 
valorem of benefited firms, subsidies to prevent capital flight might be challenged under 
WTO rules. This has not been tested yet as there has been no dispute over this kind of 
subsidies so far, but it could well be that this policy option becomes partly barred and 
therefore rendered politically unrealistic. 
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3.4 Closed to abuse 
Minimum standards as well as harmonisation of standards and an international enforce-
ment agreement are relatively closed to abuse as they depend on the consent of all par-
ties involved. Things are different with trade restrictions, which partly are targeted to-
wards non-participating and therefore non-consenting parties. These restrictions can be 
abused as participating countries (or a subset of them) might install restrictions against 
non-participants under the pretext of fulfilling its mandatory obligations according to a 
MEA, but with proper protectionist intentions instead. BTAs and subsidies are also open 
to abuse. They open a pandora’s box in that all sorts of industries will lobby policy 
makers to grant them protection from ‘unfair’ foreign competition. The incentive for 
protectionist abuse might be higher with BTAs relative to subsidies, as subsidies cost 
money to the domestic taxpayers, whereas in the case of BTAs the costs are partly borne 
by the foreign producers and partly, but much less visibly, by higher prices for domestic 
consumers. 
 
3.5 Not unnecessarily restrictive 
Minimum standards as well as harmonisation of standards are not very restrictive in the 
sense that once the standards have been established capital as well as goods and services 
are allowed to cross borders without constraint. However, in so far as some countries’ 
environmental standards might rise above their efficiency levels, these countries would 
be implicitly confronted with inefficient restrictions towards their exports of goods and 
services. An enforcement agreement is not restrictive at all as it merely aspires to ensure 
that a country’s existing laws and regulations are actually enforced. Trade restrictions 
are restrictive by definition. However, if trade restrictions as an instrument of a MEA to 
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ensure compliance and deter free-riding are fully effective, then ironically they will not 
be restrictive at all, as there is no need to employ them. The best restrictions are the ones 
that will never come into force. BTAs can be restrictive as well. If they are applied in a 
protectionist or non-transparent manner then they will restrict the flow of capital and 
goods and services. Subsidies can be restrictive as well if they are applied in a protec-
tionist manner. If they are then they will distort the comparative advantage of countries 
such that the non-subsidising countries would face implicit restrictions towards their 
exports of goods and services and their import of capital. 
 
4 Conclusion 
In a world of imperfect information about what constitutes efficient environmental stan-
dards, it is not easy to assess whether countries inefficiently fail to raise their standards 
or not. ‘Regulatory chill’ is a potentially serious, but difficult to detect phenomenon. As 
one is looking at counterfactual claims, the researcher has to rely on anecdotal evidence. 
Some of this evidence has been presented in this article. It seems fair to say that ‘regula-
tory chill’ has not been proven - neither in general nor with respect to the case of reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions. But enough evidence is there to warrant an evaluation of 
policy options to address the (potential) problem of ‘regulatory chill’, which this articles 
has attempted to do. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the findings on evaluating policy options. As can be 
seen, no option fares clearly better than all others. However, harmonisation of standards 
and multilateral trade restrictions do relatively well on our criteria so that they are rec-
ommended here as policy options to deal with potential ‘regulatory chill’ problems. The 
challenge with harmonisation of standards would be to strive for upward rather than 
downward harmonisation to make it effective in overcoming ‘regulatory chill’ and to 
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gather political support to make it more politically realistic than it currently seems to be. 
As experience with the EU has shown, one way to facilitate upward harmonisation is to 
make increased usage of majority voting in place of an unanimity requirement. The 
challenge with multilateral capital and trade restrictions would be to gather political 
support for fast and effective multilateral action on international and global environ-
mental problems. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE > 
 
How these challenges can be met, that is, what can be done to facilitate upward har-
monisation and multilateral environmental action is beyond the scope of this paper and 
the subject of ongoing research. Another objective of future research would be an ex-
amination of the evidence with respect to ‘regulatory chill’ on issues other than global 
warming. If ‘regulatory chill’ really is a significant and widespread phenomenon, then 
the payoff to research demonstrating its evidence and finding ways to overcome it will 
be very high indeed in terms of achieving sustainable development. This is because, as 
mentioned in the introduction, ‘regulatory chill’ is inimical to the very idea of sustain-
able development which requires that countries are not deterred from raising their envi-
ronmental standards for fear of capital flight. 
Another possibility would be, of course, to try to convince policy makers that their 
obsession with ‘competitiveness’ is misguided: countries do not compete with each 
other the way businesses do, hence they cannot really gain or lose ‘competitiveness’ 
(Krugman 1994). But here, as in so many other areas, what really matters is what policy 
makers believe, not what economic theory and evidence says, and there can be no doubt 
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that they actually do believe that countries compete with each other. To fight against 
their preoccupation with ‘competitiveness’ is therefore likely to be a waste of time. 
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effective - +/- -- ++ ++ ++ 
politically realistic - - - +/- - - 
closed to abuse + + + - - - 
not unnecessarily re-
strictive 
+ + ++ + +/- +/- 
 
++ very good, + good, +/- neutral, – poor, -- very poor 
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1
 The GCC counts 39 U.S. corporations and industry associations among its members (BNA 
2000a). The companies mainly come from the steel, oil, agriculture, electricity, rail and chemical indus-
tries. The associations include such important ones as the American Petroleum Institute, the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the National Mining Association. GCC lost 
several prominent members, including Royal Dutch Shell, BP Amoco, DaimlerChrysler, Ford and Texaco. 
Shell and BP changed their position and support the Kyoto Protocol by now and Chrysler had to change 
its position after being taken over by Daimler. Ford and Texaco, on the other hand, left the coalition 
merely for image reasons as they considered their continued membership to be detrimental to their reputa-
tion. However, both companies have pledged to continue opposing the Kyoto Protocol as well as any 
other mandatory greenhouse gas emission cuts (BNA 1999, BNA 2000). 
2
 As a substitute EU countries are now considering the imposition of minimum excise duties to a 
wide range of energy products. However, even this rather minimalist solution is currently blocked by 
opposition from environmental ‘laggers’ such as Ireland and Spain (ENS 1999). 
3
 Note that BTAs are only applicable for the imposition of a tax. They are not to be confused with 
so-called eco-tariffs, which are supposed to compensate for international differences in environmental 
compliance costs, whether these differences are due to taxes or not. Daly (1993, p. 26), for example, de-
mands that ‘whoever sells in a nation’s market should play by that nation’s rules or pay a tariff sufficient 
to remove the competitive advantages of lower standards’. Arden-Clarke (1993, p. 81) from the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) wants ‘environmental leaders’ to be able to ‘take trade measures that “level 
the playing field“ between environmentally sound and unsound goods.’ The International Pollution Deter-
rence Act, unsuccessfully introduced into the 102d U.S. Congress as motion S.984 by Senator Boren (D-
OK), called for countervailing duties equivalent to the cost that it would take a foreign firm to comply 
with U.S. domestic environmental standards (OTA 1992, p. 92). 
4
 This is the case, for example, with the German ecological tax reform, where energy-intensive 
manufacturing firms can get a rebate on their tax. The draft European Council Directive in its Article 10 
pomised this rebate for all energy-intensive firms. Similar exemptions apply with respect to the Danish 
and Swedish carbon/energy taxes (Brack, Grubb and Windram 2000). 
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5
 For a detailed explanation of the quite complicated legal issues involved see Brack, Grubb and 
Windram (2000, pp. 81-90); Schoenbaum (1997, pp. 308-312); Düerkop (1994, pp. 820-823). However, a 
final judgement on this question cannot be made as no WTO panel has ever decided on it. 
